At this year’s Public Law Project Annual Conference, our Legal Director Victoria Pogge von Strandmann shared a selection of influential cases from the past 12 months. R (on the application of Jwanczuk) (Respondent) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Appellant) [2025] UKSC 42 (20 November 2025) Mr Jwanczuk applied for Bereavement Support Payment after the death of his wife, who had a severe degenerative condition and had never been able to work or pay National Insurance contributions. His claim was refused because the Pensions Act 2014 requires the deceased spouse to have made qualifying contributions. Mr Jwanczuk argued that applying this requirement to someone unable to work because of disability was discriminatory under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights read with Article 1 of Protocol 1. The High Court and Court of Appeal agreed, relying on the Northern Ireland decision in O’Donnell. The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal, finding that the Court of Appeal should not have treated O’Donnell as effectively binding. Although Mr Jwanczuk fell within Article 14’s protection due to his association with a disabled spouse, the Court held that the contribution condition was objectively justified. It served legitimate aims, including encouraging workforce participation, simplifying the benefits system, and promoting certainty about entitlement. Given Parliament’s broad discretion in allocating social security resources, the rule struck a fair balance and was not unlawfully discriminatory. PLP has represented Mr Jwanczuk throughout his case, including in the appeal now lodged with the European Court of Human Rights. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) v Kolicaj (Respondent) [2025] UKSC 49 (18 December 2025) On 18 December 2025, judgment was handed down by the Supreme Court in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kolicaj [2025] UKSC 49. The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal and dismissed Mr Kolicaj’s cross-appeal. The judgment provides useful clarification on the application of the public law principle of procedural fairness to deprivation of citizenship decisions. The appeal concerned Mr Kolicaj, who had been convicted of money laundering offences, after participating in an organised crime group that removed nearly £8 million from the UK to Albania. The money was the proceeds of unspecified criminal activity. The Secretary of State decided to deprive Mr Kolicaj of his British citizenship, pursuant to s.40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 (“BNA 1981”) on the basis that his deprivation was conducive to the public good because of Mr Kolicaj’s involvement in serious, organised crime. The Supreme court held that because the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in an appeal under section 40A was appellate rather than supervisory, new evidence might be adduced and the subject matter of the appeal would be the decision as maintained at the time of the appeal in light of any new evidence and submissions. Consequently, no fairness gap arose, and there was no requirement on the Secretary of State to offer a review of the decision following an opportunity to make representations. A Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland of a devolution issue under paragraph 34 of Schedule 10 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 [2026] UKSC 16 (2 June 2026) In A Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland [2026] UKSC 16, the Supreme Court considered whether adults who lack mental capacity under the Mental Capacity Act to decide where they live and receive care can nevertheless give “valid consent” to care arrangements that might otherwise amount to a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case arose because the Northern Ireland Minister of Health proposed revising the code of practice under the Mental Capacity Act (Northern Ireland) 2016. The new code would recognise that some people who lack legal capacity may still be able to express genuine wishes and feelings about their care arrangements and therefore validly consent to them. The Supreme Court unanimously held that issuing the revised guidance would be lawful and compatible with Article 5. In reaching that conclusion, it overruled its earlier decision in Cheshire West (2014), which had established the well-known “acid test” for deprivation of liberty: continuous supervision and control, coupled with not being free to leave. The Court found that Cheshire West wrongly simplified the approach required by European human rights law. Instead, courts must undertake a broader, multifactorial assessment of a person’s situation, including the nature of the arrangements, their purpose, the person’s level of understanding, and whether they genuinely accept or object to them. A lack of legal capacity does not automatically mean a person cannot provide valid consent. This judgment significantly reshapes the law on deprivation of liberty for people receiving care in community settings. The Secretary of State for the Home Department v R (on the application of Huda Ammori) [2026] EWCA Civ 721 (15 June 2026) The England and Wales Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s order and declared the proscription of Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation by the Home Secretary under the Terrorism Act 2000 to be lawful. Huda Ammori, co-founder of Palestine Action, challenged the proscription order on the grounds that it was an unjustified and disproportionate interference with freedom of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Appeal observed that although the order had a significant ‘chilling effect’ on peaceful supporters, the Home Secretary was “better placed than the Court to adjudicate the balance of the various rights and interests engaged in the context of national security” [para.116]. The Court of Appeal held that the severe public and economic threats posed by the group’s covert structure, use of weapons, and targeting of critical defence infrastructure outweighed the individual rights of its members, making the proscription a ‘justified interference’ with rights. This case sets a high threshold for challenging proscription on proportionality grounds. The Supreme Court heard Huda Ammori’s appeal on 4 and 5 November 2026. Judgment has yet to be issued at the time of publication.